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WORK ON A LABOR THEORY OF MEANING
Kenneth Casebeer*
Work ... is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off;.., work
forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object be-
comes its form and something permanent because it is precisely for
the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle
term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality
or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the work
outside of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way,
therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the in-
dependent being [of the object] its own independence.
-Hegel: Lordship and Bondage1
Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness.
-Hegel: The Truth of Self-Certainty2
Free action is the labor of self-consciousness. Labor performs, it
embodies, it accomplishes. Labor translates time and effort into
something. People interested in freedom therefore need to investigate
how labor connects what consciousness implies: an agency or subject
seeking to know itself in meaningful surroundings and the other or
object by which in the first instance the subject differentiates itself as
conscious. For much of Western history people have thought this re-
lationship an easily articulated and natural vision: self-sufficient indi-
viduals changing an external world to suit themselves and interfering
with each other as little as possible or necessary. It is a model which
has not held up. More and more the subject or self and the object or
world external to the individual both seem made up, invented. Our
singular or individual lives gain their self-understanding less from
within than from a "web" of meaning learned from the contexts of
interaction to which we all contribute. Our security lies in the recog-
nition of each other as universally in the same predicament, even as
we notice that our singular experiences in the social network define
both what we contribute and what we take away as different and par-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. A.B., 1971, Georgetown University; J.D., 1974,
Harvard Law School; Director of the Project in Labor Theory, 1984. The author wishes to
acknowledge the critibal and helpful comments of Karl Klare, Joel Rogers, David Carlson,
and Richard Hyland, and is indebted to Robert Rosen for the notion of residual concepts.
Copyright © 1989 by Kenneth Casebeer.
1 G. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit para. 195 (A. Miller trans. 1977) (1807).
2 Id. para. 175.
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ticular. Our singular lives, then, generate particular meaning whose
content is interdependent and whose subjectivity is therefore an inter-
subjectivity.
Also, contrary to the model, our world is no longer a directly
known and relatively static resource. It is an object known only medi-
ately through partial and often conflicting explanations associated
with complexes of artificial or human created circumstances. The ar-
tificiality or sociality of what consciousness works at as free action
takes a particular form for the individual. Lives considered abstractly
become propositions or contributions struggling for recognition and
yet fearful of the consequences of gaining it. For us, the experience of
modernity is the experience of a world which can be carved up in
innumerable explanations and justifications. Even the most appealing
yield grotesques. The rule by position, or positivism, staggers under
the weight of twentieth-century despotism and bureaucratic suffoca-
tion, and the rule by nature seems random seen through the lens of
technology, the speed of change, and the insistence of the weak that
humanity, not nature, maintains the cruelty of their condition. Mo-
dernity and its putative successors commit our lives to politics, to
struggle, whether passively or actively, over the meaning of the social
circumstances we each approach differently but which cannot be es-
caped. This history entails that we reside within the state, at least as
one of our addresses. More than government, the state manifests the
inescapably political in the constitution of social structure and the le-
gitimation of its meaning. Institutions and the officials who inhabit
them fail to exhaust the state's social presence. They fail to fully ac-
count for the distribution and meaning of power within social organi-
zation. It is a salient question, therefore, as to whether and how
argument might be a form of politics with an integrity which does not
simply mimic or follow action, and a form of politics which does not
freeze but nurtures freedom. This is an essay which, in its most blunt
form, argues that freedom knows itself in work produced under con-
ditions and ethics of democracy, that democracy has authentic and
unalienated meaning only under conditions of social equality, and
that ideas count in the construction of social conditions and social
meaning.
I. IDEOLOGICAL FORM: LABOR AND TRANSFORMATIVE
ARGUMENT
3
The possibility of transformative argument is the possibility of
3 What follows is a formal argument. It is therefore synthetic rather than original.
Because it is meant to interpret and represent a tradition of thought, the expressed ideas
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argument as in itself political action. A strong version of this begin-
ning depends on an epistemology, or way of knowing the social con-
text, in which the criteria for what is true or taken as "factual" is
simultaneously normative of what should be true. In short, apprais-
ing or speculative argument demands a demonstration in both senses
of the word: an offer of proof and a way of acting.
The possibility of transformative argument suggests that its nor-
mative component contains both knowledge of material surroundings
and will, located in consciousness as subject. History for the individ-
ual begins in consciousness, her dynamic potential, and ends in the
externalization of expression or expenditure of human time. Yet his-
tory remains hypothetical form and not yet historical unless recog-
nized in lived circumstances, and remains a dream of embrace or a
fragile projection unless confirmed in the sociality of other conscious
selves. Still, confirmation remains apparent and ritualized unless its
history is history for the self just as it is for the recognizing others-
not congruent, less shared convention than jointly situated. History
only exists in social interiority. Free action requires reconstruction of
a consciousness of social experience which is capable of becoming
continuously less false than any predecessor to the modem human
condition of inescapable interdependence in material conditions, and,
given such interdependence, to the equal warrant of each to under-
stand-that is, participate-in the continuous explanation of those
conditions. In short, free action requires an articulation of the experi-
ence of democracy.
The affirmation and constructive character of democracy as
praxis-both idea and practice-associates consciousness with partic-
ipation, and meaning with productive activity. I call the production
of meaning embedded in the reproduction of society "social labor."4
Taking the form of a programmatic statement or ideology, this Essay
outlines some of the entailments of democratic experience as critical
construction. In this initial, vulnerable, and extremely tentative fash-
ion, an attempt begins to illustrate the political necessity of a con-
structive, affirmative, and defensible program for social change. This
claim involves the simultaneous disavowal of utopian programs and
proceduralist solutions to the antinomies of the dominant ideology,
usually cannot be attributed to single sources. Only direct quotations or paraphrases will be
immediately footnoted. Particular debts are owed to contemporary work by Jiirgen
Habermas, Axel Honneth, Roberto Unger, Drucilla Cornell, Seyla Benhabib, and Charles
Taylor, and to the traditions of Hegel, Marx, Hannah Arendt, Wittgenstein, and Dewey. The
traditional arguments, however, are assumed rather than fully reproduced.
4 For a discussion of the contemporary relevance of Hegel's idea of social labor, see C.
Taylor, Hegel and Modem Society (1979).
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liberal individualism;5 seeks to vindicate immanent critique in the
manner of the Frankfurt School; argues the contemporary inevitabil-
ity of pragmatist solutions to the problem of critique; and suggests
that it is unwise to abandon the legal arena as a contested terrain in
the contemporary period. In short, what is sought is a theoretical
reason to move in one social direction rather than another.6 Further,
this twin beginning is prioritized such that democratic equal warrant
is a precondition to argument as transformation. This is because the
construction of social structure constitutes power, and thus the social
relations in which power gains meaning cannot be indifferent to the
form of its political content.
Chiefly, this beginning philosophically requires: the collapse of
the fact-value distinction, a coherence theory of truth, decentered sub-
jectivity, synthetic social construction of ideas, norms of participatory
social integration, and the overcoming of false consciousness by
means of critique of ideology. Collectively, these conceptual moves
describe a strong view of history in which the present appears as if in
historical narrative 7 and action follows the form of labor: most gener-
ally, the construction of intelligibility.
II. LABOR: TRADITION
In the social theory tradition, "labor" is the fundamental social
activity, although recent methodology calls this assumption into ques-
tion.' This deemphasizing of labor represents a mistaken turn for the
Hegelian wing of the tradition. The nature of the mistake only partly
depends on the claimed loss of centrality of employed work in shaping
individual identities and interests. More depends on theoretical con-
fusion of employment, and by extension all work, as it has come to be
restricted in both symbol and practice by political, economic, and cul-
tural systems of domination, with labor as an emancipating form of
life. Rethinking the historical role of labor as a concept thus intrudes
on the social theory corpus.9
Hegel's insight into the interdependence of human nature and its
contingency in history begins a new, perhaps our own, epoch as surely
as the atomistic state of nature and the mechanistic reason of Hobbes
5 On liberalism and its antinomies, see R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975).
6 On the need to choose political society, see Rorty, Habermas and Lyotard on Post-
Modernity, 4 Praxis Int'l 32 (1984).
7 See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984).
8 See C. Offe, Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and
Politics 129-50 (1985).
9 For a discussion of the role of labor in social theory, see Giddens, Labour and Interac-
tion, in Habermas: Critical Debates 149 (J. Thompson & D. Held eds. 1982).
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identified the previous, and as yet unyielding, world view. For Hegel,
labor and linguistic interaction represented two aspects of overcoming
the domination of nature over humanity-labor to overcome the
domination of nature and transform it to satisfy human needs, lan-
guage to mediate sensory perceptions. Although linked in the abso-
lute identity of spirit, the two forms of action were irreducible, as
labor related to causal processes and language to consensual, and
therefore interactive, norms.
When Marx removed the idealist grounding of both labor and
language in favor of historical materialism, each concept remained
separate within the conceptual forms of material conditions and social
relations. However, the range of options available to social choices
depended on the priority of material reproduction of the conditions of
historical societies. Accordingly, the self-formative process shifted
from Hegel's externalization of the spirit to Marx's reflection of con-
ditions of human existence. Still, nature only appeared to humanity
as mediated bylabor which therefore achieved epistemic priority. Yet
the triumph of labor over nature came at the expense of trapping all
thought in the technical manipulation of barriers to transforming re-
sources into action. Resources included all factors of production, in
turn including other human beings by virtue of their labor. Reducing
all interaction to technique made plain the forms of exploitation and
domination, but at the same time limited the ability to overcome such
relations to the transformation of material conditions. Change in con-
ditions required the agency of a personified group or class of the alien-
ated to effectuate change. In the end, if history does not evolve to
produce this outcome, it is unclear how a system of meaning capable
of generating a critical program could be independently discovered or
developed.
Building on the extension of the critique of rationality by Weber,
Georg Lukics argued that patterns of acting or of rationalizing condi-
tions of production were contingently reified into a consciousness, and
thus the social relations, of a particular history of economy. As all
social life increasingly appeared as a series of exchanges in the form of
commodities, the conditions of producing and maintaining society
themselves dialectically intensified the total and voracious experience
of exchange. Priority of material conditions as opposed to conscious-
ness ceased to be the most interesting conceptual question. Rather,
difficulties or crises in reproducing material conditions created an in-
stability in necessary assumptions about human organization which
permitted breaking through the social totality sustained by the ideol-
16411989] WORK
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ogy of commodity exchange as a form of life.' 0 Yet once again, such a
possibility depended on the vagaries of history.
The Frankfurt School, led by Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno, responded to Lukics's argument by widening the autonomy
of conditions and relations. They directly attacked the ideology he
had observed of technical manipulation of a conceptualized reality.
To them, Lukdcs's recommended dissolution of the reified conscious-
ness of commodity forms of interaction attacked only a particular
manifestation of false objectivity.'1 Thus an independent realm of
reason in history, shorn of idealist grounding, began to be seen as
controlling, in part, the development of material conditions. Never-
theless, behind the conceptual evolution of technology, reason served
to maintain the domination of those who could control technological
organization and production. Labor thus marked off the sector of ex-
perience in which the uses of workers' products were appropriated in
exchange relations assumed by an organizational form in turn con-
trolled by ever more technical reproductions of the division of labor.
In response to the altered status of ideas, Horkheimer and Adorno
generated a negative dialectic attacking the ideology or false con-
sciousness of technical progress.' 2 But as the form of material condi-
tions had become subordinate to technical relations, neither labor nor
interactive conceptualization could generate more than negation of
current technique. Thus, no affirmative critique could be constructed,
and the meaning of progress in generating material change became
problematic. For the Frankfurt School, recognition of the interdepen-
dence of selves hidden behind the apparent atomistic will of contract
could never escape distortion while linked to social relations concep-
tualized in conjunction with technological manipulation of all nature
outside each self. For them, the self-interest of exchange simply gen-
eralized to a technique of reason. The only way to pursue intercon-
nectedness required continuously tearing down any theory of self-
identity which would limit the understanding of the other to some
form of a conceptualized use value.' 3
Jirgen Habermas simultaneously acknowledges the collapse of
material conditions and social relations into systems of purposive-ra-
10 See G. Lukics, History and Class Consciousness 83-222 (R. Livingstone trans. 1971).
11 See generally F. Dallmayr, Twilight of Subjectivity (1981) (survey of the twentieth-cen-
tury Marxian tradition).
12 See, e.g., T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (E.B. Ashton trans. 1973); T. Adorno & M.
Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (J. Cumming trans. 1972); Horkheimer, Traditional
and Critical Theory, in Critical Theory 188 (M. O'Connell trans. 1972).
'3 Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1870-77 (1987).
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tional actions, and resurrects the separation of labor and interaction. 4
Labor equates with purposive-rational action, whether in instru-
mental manipulation of nature or organizations, or in strategic inter-
action toward political or personal interests. The problem of scientific
or technological rationality is not the manipulation of the other per
se, but technology's universal extension to all aspects of life. This
becomes particularly acute given the Frankfurt writers' earlier dem-
onstration of the lack of separation of material conditions and social
relations as spheres of instrumental behavior. By rearticulating
human activity outwardly directed in labor (material or social) as sub-
ject overcoming object, and inwardly directed in self-discovery
through meaning generated by the interactive production of language,
two openings emerge within purely historical experience. First, an-
other realm of activity-communication-appears, from which it is
apparently possible to generate self-consciousness and ground critique
of material conditions and strategic relations. Second, the form of
communicative consciousness returns to Hegel's insight of interde-
pendent interaction by which to break the inherent domination of
subject-object relations embedded in technical rationality. Habermas
recognizes that in practice, purposive action is inseparable from com-
municative interdependence, but insists that analytically a complete
self-consciousness depends on the irreducibility of labor and commu-
nication in the differentiated experiences of working according to
technique and working according to justificatory norms. False con-
sciousness can be identified by reference to its failure to be produced
according to universal pragmatic norms experienced as necessary to
the mutual recognition presupposed by communicative, as opposed to
strategic, interaction. Emancipation emerges from the contradiction
between ideological 'domination and the potential for communicative
reflection. In this way a political program can be contextually defined
in opposition to situations of domination, domination residing in
those social situations produced pursuant to purposive-rational ma-
nipulations beyond those in some sense necessary to continued
survival. I 5
While agreeing with the essentials of Habermas's critique of ra-
tionality, and indeed the importance of a communicative ethics, a pro-
gram of equal warrant for interdependently constituted selves must
further attempt to rehabilitate the epistemic importance of social la-
14 See J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (J. Shapiro trans. 1968).
15 For the development of Habermas's theory of the emancipatory potential of communi-
cations, see J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (T. McCarthy trans.
1976).
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bor. Social labor remains central for several reasons. First, because
the reproduction of society is embedded in networks of interactions
and partly accomplished by virtue of communicative and symbolic
structures. Second, because those interactive settings themselves are
constructed according to the same norms and institutions governing
all production, including meaning. Third, because pragmatic stan-
dards of overcoming alienation by practices recognizing the self in the
other seem more a matter of construction or labor than of action ac-
cording to a regulatory ideal or procedure.
Meaningful critique must embrace more than linguistic practice.
More than simply distorted communication, the experience of aliena-
tion encompasses distorted meaning. The difficulty is not that consen-
sual norms founded in reciprocal agreement differ from rules of
technical manipulation, but that the meaning or knowledge necessary
to distinguish them as two types of action must itself be produced. To
the extent that critical bite stems from a hermeneutic or interpretive
understanding generated by communication as opposed to empirical
standards or technique, it would seem that only a stronger theory of
truth than coherence determines when the appearance of mutuality in
communication is authentic, and that such truth must be grounded
outside interpretations. This requirement seems inconsistent with a
purely analytic separation of labor and interaction. If not, it must
be the case that programmatic coherence standards parallel to
Habermas's communicative rationality can in principle work to
critique social labor according to standards of collective construction
or interdependence, just as they critique action in the form of
communication.
An understanding of labor which is no longer limited to Marx's
understanding of work as value production is necessary. That is, an
understanding which treats social labor as the socially organized pro-
ductive activities in which humans interact with material nature but
in which the material world has been so mediated by human process-
ing that any knowledge of it obtains solely from social constructs. In
short, a labor theory of meaning is needed which understands both
fact and value to be simultaneously known by virtue of interdepen-
dent production. Such a theory would contain similar regulatory
ideals to those of mutual communication, but appropriate to the
workplace or the situation of construction more generally, and thus
would provide grounds for a critique of current practice in pragmatic
terms. Unlike negative dialectics, this immanent critique would be
aimed less at the symbolic level of communicative understanding and
more at the union of ideology and practice.
1644 [Vol. 10:1637
Seyla Benhabib has carefully developed an argument which in
some ways parallels both the work of Habermas and this Essay, that
also needs to be distinguished.1 6 Within the tradition of Hegel and
Marx, Benhabib develops the work model of activity as a philosophy
of the subject. The subject's labor fully mediates human access to the
world or other (object), simultaneously constituting its facticity and
expressing its value experienced as use. Human capacities are ex-
pressed in their being historically externalized. Labor transforms and
thus objectifies its object, the surrounding world. However, Benhabib
believes with Habermas that actions of externalizing the self in work
cannot account for the experience of mutual reciprocity which consti-
tutes symbolic interaction. Unlike Habermas, she is willing to argue
that the separation of communicative interaction and self-actualiza-
tion are more than analytically separate in that they correspond to the
separate epistemic situations of intersubjectivity and transsubjectiv-
ity-the latter corresponding to the systematic viewpoint of a third-
party observer. Action, if limited to work, makes the human subject
monological and ignores other modes of experience such as language
and culture. Further, it is this separation of interaction and self-actu-
alization that requires differentiating norms of system fulfillment from
those of utopian transfiguration. The communicative ethic contains a
utopian content allowing the participation of difference and plurality
seemingly denied by the subject as a working individual or a working
collective society defined by its division of labor. Collective work
means history can only express one meaning, thereby providing no
empirical account for a plurality of expressive experiences. But as
Benhabib recognizes, "[i]f, for social agents, the meaning and validity
of their actions reside in their understanding of these actions, then the
agents can only solve the problems of their collective life insofar as
they participate in processes which define the problem as well as the
answer."' 7 Communication may provide some answers to some dis-
junctions of experience and meaning, but by itself communication in
Benhabib's terms cannot generate or account for the problems associ-
ated with production of meaning or of conditions of modern society.
Benhabib unnecessarily limits labor to Hegelian expressive activ-
ity and Marxian self-actualization of individual selves or a collective
singular self. A labor theory of meaning, however, presupposes only
that human activity constitutes intelligibility, not any particular
version of the working subject. Just as acting according to mutual
recognition is consonant with symbolic interaction or communication
16 See S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia (1986); see especially id. at 133-43.
17 Id. at 103.
16451989] WORK
CARDOZO LAW RE VIEW
and would be authenticated in immanent critique of strategic behavior
in communicative forms, so is the broader notion of intelligibility.
When intelligibility is actualized in recognition of interdependent con-
textual social conditions, the mutuality now made conscious is not
that of the Hegelian-Marxian subject, but rather the intersubjective
self. This is also Benhabib's ultimate goal. But if this burden can be
carried by a labor theory, the impossible task of justifying the view-
points of transubjective observation and utopian norms, both of which
stand outside the actions of individuals in historic time, can be
dispensed with.18 To do so, the labor theory of meaning accepts as
politics the inherent indeterminacy caused by conflating producing
conditions and learning (producing) moral interaction. Strategic
behavior, of course, cannot then be held off by utopian moments of
communicative interaction. Strategy must instead be redirected via
conscious efforts to control alienation in both communication and in-
strumental action.
Interdependence can only be meaningfully or coherently known
in or as a result of interaction, and only authenticated by reconstruc-
tion of consciousness consonant with the content of the self as inter-
subjective. Pragmatically, as interaction approaches authenticity, the
confirmation of the self in the other is no longer through use of the
other, and therefore a relation of dependence, but rather the redirec-
tion and overcoming of individual strategies in mutual recognition-
consciousness of intersubjectively reciprocal constitution. The
emphasis on interdependence and consciousness of mutuality of
Habermas and Hegel is thus introduced into Marx's centralization of
social labor and historical contextuality, but without deriving the
character of ideas and communication from a distinguished material
circumstance.
III. LABOR: CONSTRUCTION
The fundamental experience of modernity, both who we are as
individual selves, insofar as that identity can be known, and our col-
lective relationship to nature, including the conditions and needs of
survival, is an experience of social construction. Moreover, this life
process is not optional. Our awareness of time passing is omnipres-
ent, there is always the question of what to be. Consciousness of so-
cial construction makes central the expenditure of human creative
activity, namely labor, and in particular, the relation of labor to the
18 See Warnke, Marxism and Expressivism, Comments on Benhabib's Critique, Norm and
Utopia (Book Review), 12 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 374 (1987).
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reproduction of the social structure context of human life.19 The
modem world is a produced layering of social structures and conven-
tions, each related and involved in the others, whether we speak of
instrumental exploitation of "natural" resources in social modes of
production, of the satisfaction of human needs, of technologies of re-
source organization, or more ambiguously, of instrumental and sym-
bolic systems of languages and scientistic models of knowledge. The
modem world, then, consists of historically generated contexts of
use." Nothing of or in the world yields direct contact. All our expe-
rience is either mediated by received tradition, institutionalized prac-
tices, or our own collective labor. Even internal processes such as
dreaming or thinking, or external interactions of emotions, which lie
strictly outside social labor are known by symbols produced in social
construction. Even that which we do not think of as processed by our
collective labor is characterized or known dialectically through active
human involvement or science. The concept of "the natural," then, is
a characterization of comfort or appropriateness to the current social
construction.
Making and testing knowledge claims about objects is one among
the many activities that we pursue; it is part of our form of lifecand
only makes sense within it, and consequently can in no way pro-
vide the model for the whole. So argues Wittgenstein. Registering
facts about objects itself presupposes an activity of the subject, a
subject whose nature must be understood in different terms and the
exploration of which, indeed, ultimately challenges the very dis-
tinction between ourselves and objects around us with which we
started. So argues Hegel.21
The particular content or meaning of social structures and
human interaction in society will depend on the history of the polit-
ical economy of social reproduction-both the modes of organized
production of material conditions of the society and the appropriate
social relations necessary to such production. In addition, however, it
is a mistake to necessitate the separation of life-world production (the
human mediated world we take for granted)22 and conscious relations
of interaction. It is simply impossible on other than purely analytical
19 See Honneth, Work and Instrumental Action, 9 New German Critique 31 (Spring/Sum-
mer 1982).
20 See Baxter, System and Life-World in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action, 16
Theory and Society 39 (1987).
21 Taylor & Montefiore, Introduction to G. Kortian, Metacritique: The Philosophical Ar-
gument of Jiirgen Habermas at 20 (1980).
22 For the most complete development of life-world, see 1 J. Habermas, The Theory of
Communicative Action (T. McCarthy trans. 1985), and 2 J. Habermas, The Theory of Com-
municative Action (T. McCarthy trans. 1987).
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or conventional grounds to separate qualitative sectors of our experi-
ence: extraction of resources, natural or synthetic; from the produc-
tion of material conditions; from the production of technologies of
manipulation; from the production of culture, including symbolic
communication; from the production of ideas, names, and conceptual
syntheses. First, these actions are all organized and technologized.
Second, they are all linked'in production chains by increasingly intri-
cate divisions of labor. Third, they overlap and crosscut each other in
myriad and nonprioritized patterns and institutions. Consciousness
of social contexts from a societal standpoint comes to be produced in
the same manner as material conditions. At this point, the technol-
ogy of resource exploitation seems virtually parallel to the use of any
complex convention or idea. That is, to the extent the world is an
experience of translating human time into intelligibility, meaning and
its phenomenal objects, whether condition or relation, stand in a dia-
lectical relation to each other in which the conditions of existence
taken as real can be apprehended in observable appearances mani-
fested in discourse and artifacts.
A borrowed example contrasts the subjective intentions of indi-
vidual employees and employers, themselves products of multiple
individual social experiences and backgrounds, with the social inten-
tions of the language of expression of such interests in the social rela-
tion of employment constituted by economic and legal constructions
such as contract, wage, pension, and compensation. While analyti-
cally 'separate as interests and yet again as products of social exper-
iences, the history of employee and employer involves not simply
translation of individual experience into contract rhetoric but a learn-
ing of ideologically appropriate behavior constituting meaning for and
between the parties as well.23
It is crucial to note that this position entails the rejection of both
a traditional separation of material conditions and social relations
(base and superstructure) and its accompanying material priority, and
Habermas's separation of spheres of purposive-rational activity (over-
coming the domination of the external world) and interactive dis-
course (overcoming the domination of the internal world of the self),
at least in any but an analytic sense.24
23 For the conceptual relationship between contract and the organization of work, see
Woodiwiss, The Discourses of Production (Part 1): Law, Industrial Relations and the Theory
of Ideology, 16 Economy and Society 275 (1987).
24 Habermas insists on his strategy because
the basic epistemological concept of 'constitution', which refers to the formation of
object domains, causes confusion in social theory. It suggests that speaking and
acting subjects 'produce' their social life-context in a way similar to that in which
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The burden of developing a critical consciousness from within a
nondifferentiated, communicatively interactive labor production of
meaning is accepted here. If workable under criteria of coherence, the
resulting meaning would serve the same functions as, or would be
equivalent to, the life-world. Denying the Nietzschean possibility,25
the very ability to stand outside the production of social existence dis-
appears. Social constitution via a labor theory of meaning does not
require this, while a communicative competence known as true seem-
ingly does. Further, social constitution does not exclude the adoption
of a systems standpoint as a conventional mode of analysis, so long as
the ability and content of this representation is understood as itself
a part or strategy of social reconstruction. But nonrelativistic and
noninstrumental rationality is problematic, and is thus itself an object
of social struggle.
Equating labor with the translation of human time into intelligi-
bility abstracts it from the traditional role played by work in political
sociology. Labor marked off a sector of human experience from other
areas of life and from the economic activity of ownership and control
of productive organization and process. Doubt'develops about the
traditional notion. First, the rise of service economies and heteroge-
neity of work forms and the consequent redefinition of the role of
class associated primarily with work26 corresponds to the growing in-
separability of instrumental sectors of activity-from industry to ser-
vicing to managing to educating. 27 The economically rational and the
they make products of instrumental action. I prefer to introduce the concept of
the life-world as a complementary concept to communicative action; and I under-
stand communicative action as the same medium through which the symbolic
structures of the life-world are reproduced. At the same time, instrumental ac-
tions, that is, interventions in the objective world, present themselves as the me-
dium through which the material substratum of the life-world is reproduced, that
is, through which the life-world develops processes of exchange with external na-
ture. From the perspective of an outside observer who objectivates the life-world,
these 'material exchange processes' can be analyzed as functional interconnections
and as self-regulating systems.
Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, in Habermas: Critical Debates 254, 268 (J. Thompson & D.
Held eds. 1982). The status and context of this preference for life-world over social constitu-
tion is unclear. It seems in tension with purely analytical separation of labor and interaction,
and yet it also seems necessary for communicative interaction to be set against social labor.
Habermas does not specify how the life-world informs the organization of economic and polit-
ical relations, or conversely how the reproduction of state and economy proceeds without
structuring communicative contexts. See Baxter, supra note 20, at 72.
25 See Taylor, Overcoming Epistemology, in After Philosophy: End or Transformation
464, 481 (K. Baynes, J. Bohman & T. McCarthy eds. 1987).
26 For a redefinition of the use of class analysis, see C. Offe, supra note 8.
27 Keane, On Tools and Language: Habermas on Work and Interaction, 2 New German
Critique 82, 93 (Fall 1975).
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technically rational begin to merge in human capital theory and ra-
tional choice theory. Second, the exploitation or domination of work-
ers as a separate or personified class was explained by reference to a
labor theory of value, leading to the market-created separation of use
and exchange values. The value of labor embodied in the use of the
resulting product was thought to be exploited by the owners of the
means of production who paid the worker only a portion of the value
the product commanded in exchange for other products or money.
For the previous reason, as technique collapses into the economic, as
use collapses into exchange in all realms-economic, political, cul-
tural-domination becomes first, cut away from a simple class analy-
sis, and second, more broadly identified and understood with the
rational accommodation of economic and political power.28 Class dis-
tinctions do not disappear but they are a consequence of the construc-
tion of relational behavior associated with structures of power.
Again, as power becomes more marked by acquisition, a consump-
tion-oriented division of labor distills meaning in historical culture;
consumption is learned to exhaust use and then exchange. Beyond
expanding the terrain which labor illuminates by extending labor be-
yond value to meaning, labor theory provides a critique of the in-
authenticity of meaning as accumulation. Communicative regularity
seems less capable of expanding its thin theory of authenticity when
interactively limited to empirically consumptive experiences of com-
municating individuals.
Two alternatives to communicative regularity seem plausible:
(a) jettisoning the centrality of work or labor as a central category of
analysis in favor of a more heterogeneous but also indeterminate set of
variables lacking coherent political outcomes,2 9 or (b) seeing the im-
portance of labor as more abstract than valorization, as the constitu-
tion of fact and value or "factvalue. ' ' 30 The key issues cease being
only about who controls material production and the social relations
embedded in it, but rather who controls the rationalization of the pro-
duction of social meaning, which in turn gives rise to organizational
manifestations of such power in socialized productive relations. The
advantage of this conceptual choice sociologically is that the old
Marxian questions remain relevant, if no longer exclusive, and shifted
to different contexts of domination.31
28 On the relationship between social and political organization and rationality, see J. Co-
hen & J. Rogers, On Democracy (1983).
29 See, e.g., S. Resnick & R. Wolff, Knowledge and Class 139 (1987).
30 See, e.g., S. Benhabib, supra note 16, at 65-66.
31 For the redeployment of Marx, without distinguishing between economy and culture,
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The epistemic priority of a labor theory of meaning does not sug-
gest a functional or structural priority of economic processes over
political, technological, or cultural social processes. Each sphere is
imbricated in the others. In fact, this labor theory partly seeks to
overcome the pressure to reductionism as an epistemic bow to causal-
ity. At the same time, the dimension of social practice within which
the world is constructed out of its "real" setting remains labor more
broadly understood as a construction of meaning. The key to concep-
tual and therefore economic domination for the current historical
period remains most prominently the form of social relation as indi-
vidual or atomistic exchange. As the material conditions of social life
themselves take on more and more the appearance of a technology of
exchange, all life seems simultaneously material and consumptive,
and therefore involves strategic symbolic interaction, not simply in-
strumental behavior within conditions of interdependence. To adopt
Habermas's distinction, the instrumental refers to technological ma-
nipulation of material circumstances of satisfaction of human needs,
and strategic behavior identifies intentional manipulation of cultural
and communicative contexts for personal benefit.3 2 All objects in-
cluding other humans tend to be reduced to consumption by an avari-
cious individual subject.
Contemporary understanding cannot escape our social situation
of an increasingly complex and often simultaneous webbing of ex-
changes of goods, resources, energy, information, and even discursive
meaning.33 The individual cannot escape the culturally induced per-
ception of playing against the web. At the same time, she engages in
wishful thinking to believe the self actually sufficient just because of
those singular life experiences given the interactive constitution of all
her meaning of such experience. To be clear, the individual's dialecti-
cal structure of experience involves a life history which is conscious in
a personal identity or self-intention, but whose knowledge or meaning
of that life history is collectively constituted by the intersubjectivity of
interactive relations and interdependent social conditions. Singularity
of personal experience and particularity of personal meaning should
not be cavalierly equated once they are no longer posited as nature
but historically constructed. 4
Individuals, by virtue of the constructing of meaning which is
see H. Marcuse, The Foundation of Historical Materialism, in Studies in Critical Philosophy 3
(J. DeBres trans. 1972).
32 1 J. Habermas, supra note 22, at 285.
33 See S. Benhabib, supra note 16.
34 Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1575, 1582-83 (1989).
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their labor, do have access of some kind to the product originating in
their social relations. Just as different artists or musicians interpret
the same images or passages in distinct signatures, each of us filters
even joint experience of partially received meanings within their very
construction. Yet value relations and power relations, as contexts of
interpretation, must be constructed and explained; moreover, they
must be learned. As both value and power in society are problematic
and historically specific, social reproduction will require both articu-
lation of the relation of conflict to the "needs" of the society's mode of
production, and mediation of social struggle within the socialized re-
lations of production. This is the source of difference. The construc-
tion of power apprehended in social structure and interpreted in social
relations authenticates the presence of difference in self-consciousness,
or else, and perhaps simultaneously, it engenders a self-understanding
of domination correlated to alienation and inauthenticity. The
decentered subject thus struggles to replace the enlightenment's self-
others monad.
To be conscious is to adopt a stance of recognition or location in
the social web, not simply a determined role in the social structure or
on grounds of utility, but as a participant in a social history. This
stance, by virtue of the interdependence of productive and social rela-
tions, is dynamic, inescapable, and manifold. As each personal his-
tory reflects a substantially unique constellation of interactions and
received experience, collective intersubjectivity involves a certain
sense of each, determining each, and all determining all, in historical
construction. It also ultimately reflects a nondistinction as to whether
the subject is the self or society.
This is an important sense in which a labor theory of meaning
contrasts with the theories of overdetermination of Stephen Resnick
and Richard Wolff, and Louis Althusser. 35 Overdetermination posits
that all theories are known by virtue of their connections with all
other theories and conditions. Causality ceases to be an interesting
question and therefore any sense of economic or any other determi-
nacy disappears. The theoretical strengths of such an argument are,
first, the explicit political nature of any theory pursued against all
other theories as each overdetermines the other, and second, the rejec-
tion of any empirical or rational epistemology (essentialism). The rec-
ognition that all particulars of meaning are dialectically constitutive
35 See, e.g., L. Althusser & E. Balibar, Reading Capital (B. Brewster trans. 1970); S. Res-
nick & R. Wolff, supra note 29, at 49-52, 87-89; see Salim El Hassan, Consciousness and
Ideology, A Critique of Lukics, Althusser and Poulantzas, 11 Dialectical Anthropology 49
(1986).
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of all other particulars within a social totality, however, does not in
itself require overdetermination. Any essentialist theory which argues
knowledge is necessarily related to a reality underlying knowledge;
whether as a matter of fact (empiricism) or of thought (rationalism) is
also opposed by noncognitivist theories such as pragmatism. Particu-
larly, if the reproduction of theory in intersubjective relations is pro-
duced in the same manner as the reproduction of interdependent
social conditions, the social division of labor mediates the relationship
of thought (whose materials are the result of social constructions) and
being (whose content is known by social construction). In this sense,
pragmatism is not a weak form of empiricism since its consequential-
ism is itself within historical construction. Yet, unlike overdetermina-
tion theories, causality, priority, and the origins of conflict do matter,
understood from the internal and dialectical standpoint of social con-
struction. That is, a theory of action can be judged by whether acting
accordingly reconciles or further alienates social actors from and
within the production of meaning. Of course, many actions will lead
in both directions. From this standpoint, although theory cannot es-
cape a political justification, any theory is not just as good as any
other. The content of an ideology is not simply a pejorative applied to
other theories for political purposes, and therefore, politically indeter-
minate except as an existential choice.
A society predictably will attempt to integrate its members
through their learned aspects of consciousness. This socialization ob-
scures whether the integration is by virtue of a shared false under-
standing of social "needs" or imposed through socially constructed
power. The historically specific mechanisms and control of socializa-
tion simply become crucial to the "efficient" organization of labor in
that period. The labor of construction is thus charged with "rational"
politics, by virtue of which the stance of knowledge is integration
rather than transcendent universality.
The true system of thought, like the rational form of life does not
stand over and against the others like a 'lifeless universal,' but
grows out of a progressive deepening and enrichment where noth-
ing is ever lost or wasted but is overcome and preserved in a newer,
more comprehensive whole.36
Hence the struggle over the content of knowledge is the struggle over
the division of labor.
36 Smith, Hegel's Idea of a Critical Theory, 15 Pol. Theory 99, 110 (1987).
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IV. DEMOCRACY: RATIONALITY
That the way things are is not the way things should be is also
part of present experience in the form of the residual experience la-
beled "alienation." Alienation, at first experienced as the exploitive
separation of the self and its product, is generalized to the distancing
of individual experience from control over self-identity (participation
in intersubjective constitution of the self in others). Overcoming
alienation cannot generate a determinate or singularly appropriate
program. Rather, progress stems from the motivation born in suffer-
ing the disjunction between present practices and their attributed ex-
planations inhering in legitimation or learned interpretation of social
practices. "Packages" of meaning and the justifications of actionable
judgments made upon their reliability can be tested for internal con-
sistency and the norms associated with the processes of the subject
"known" as interactively constitutive of them. But such disjunction
and the assertion of the emancipation of work, recognizable in some
collective sense as one's own, cannot be limited to communicative
contexts. For in each case of contradiction, a specific form of action is
made manifest by the location of its alienation and therefore its lack
of interactive intelligibility. "What distinguishes phenomenological
critique from mere skepticism is that the falsehood of experience is
viewed as a learning process in which knowledge of the inadequacy of
previous experiences is integrated into and becomes an aspect of sub-
sequent experiences." ' It is made actionable by virtue of workable
social practices and their explanation, which reduce the residual of
experience known by its alienation. 8
It thus seems both possible and necessary to see with Habermas
that a recognition of rationality is a product of discourse which re-
spects interdependence and equal warrant. A rationality possessed
only in interaction represents an advance over a critical tradition de-
pendent on subject-object dichotomies and implying both access by
the subject to know experience in some transcendental way and the
ability to suppress the urge to dominate the other, whether as nature,
another subject, or self. Rationality implies choice. Choice implies
alternatives which are in principle knowable or conscious. Conscious-
ness is inherently false to the extent it is associated with experience
which does not satisfy both conditions of interdependence and equal
warrant simultaneously. It is false to the extent that equality means
formal opportunity to participate, dissociated from actual interdepen-
37 S. Benhabib, supra note 16, at 51.
38 See Honneth, supra note 19.
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dence of material wealth and its production by an argument of indi-
vidualistic response to constellations of social relations such as
markets. Formal opportunity is meaningless because it suggests that
opportunity stands outside social practices rather than depending on
the resources only generated, used, and known by virtue of social ac-
tivity, itself known only by social production. Consciousness is
equally false to the extent that interdependence validates hierarchical
determinations of the rigidity or inevitability of economic organiza-
tion inconsistent with every participant's right to question the "natu-
ralness" of the current structure of ordinary relationships from within
those relations. If the former view makes choice empty, the latter
makes it perverse.
It simultaneously seems both possible and necessary to see with
Luka'cs that the lack of separation between production of culture and
production of material society makes discourse inherently con-
flicted-at once symbolic and strategic. Still, strategy can be ex-
plained without attributing conflict to the trap of the totalization
phenomenon. Strategy must be redirected in intentional action which
recognizes difference by attacking domination. Habermas means
communicative interaction to be a moral evolutionary experience to
be set against and indeed replace that purposive instrumental or stra-
tegic behavior simply extended or learned from the necessary repro-
duction of material conditions. Yet if communication is not to be
simply a regulatory ideal, an account of consciousness must determine
true communication (mutuality of coherence) from false communica-
tions or purely and nonreciprocal strategic behavior within interac-
tion. 9 What the universal pragmatic of Karl-Otto Apel 0 and per-
haps Habermas "neglects is the possibility that growing rationality
may be accompanied by a decline of moral sensitivity, a possibility
which underscores the point that ethics is not purely a matter of
thought but also of action."41 This is, of course, an issue for con-
sciousness accompanying labor as well.
A critical concept of work must grasp categorically the difference
between an instrumental act, in which the working subject struc-
tures and regulates his own activity on his own initiative, according
to his own knowledge, in a self-contained process, and an instru-
mental act, in which neither the accompanying controls nor the
object-related structuring of the activity is left to the initiative of
39 T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas 16-40 (1978).
40 See Apel, The Problem of Philosophical Foundations in Light of a Transcendental
Pragmatics of Language, in After Philosophy: End or Transformation 250 (K. Baynes, J.
Bohman & T. McCarthy eds. 1987).
41 F. Dallmayr, supra note 11, at 250.
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the working subject.42
But it is the pragmatism of directly responding to alienation by re-
structuring the labor of intelligibility in a participatory interactive
work which generates knowledge, defining the difference between so-
cial labor and communicative rationality.43 First, this in no way
reduces the importance of the communicative ideal even as labor as
meaning generalizes and displaces it to other forms of interaction.
Further, removing the distortion of communication in itself implies
radical change in social relations of work.' Finally, if the use of lan-
guage presupposes a context of interaction, so does social labor. In
this way, social theory preserves the emancipatory potential still avail-
able in social labor.45
The process of emancipatory reflection, which as Habermas sup-
poses, takes place in acts of communication, breaks radically
through relations of interaction which have been distorted by the
given social structure; it attempts to recover the goal of mutual
understanding, immanent in such relations, from the society's re-
pressive form of organization .... [T]his process would corre-
spond to a morally oriented process of action in the area of social
labor, which recovers the work content of instrumental acts from
the dominant forms of work. The valid normative claim which
thus comes to expression results from the moral vulnerability
which grows not from the suppression of communicative modes of
mutual understanding, but from the expropriation of the workers'
own work activity. The, moral knowledge which is constructed on
the basis of such experiences is embodied in acts of work which
maintain their autonomy even in the organizational reality of ex-
ternally determined work relations.46
In terms of a labor theory of meaning, such expropriated meaning
negates the authentication of the individual as a mutually interdepen-
dent member of society, whose work is a real-time repository of the
mutuality of intersubjective constitution.
On the other hand, if argument (discourse) is produced in the
same manner as other commodities, then when it is a conceptualiza-
tion of relations between producers of commodities, argument is si-
multaneously manifest in material condition and consciousness. The
possibility of transformative arguments, as both input and product of
rational discourse remains only that-a possibility. Yet on these
42 Honneth, supra note 19, at 52-53.
43 Rorty, supra note 6, at 34-35.
44 Keane, supra note 27, at 96-97.
45 See Welmer, Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of Enlightenment, in Habermas and Mo-
dernity 35 (R. Bernstein ed. 1985).
46 Honneth, supra note 19, at 53-54.
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terms, an identification of false consciousness within discourse does
not necessarily depend on a prior displaced conflict in economic rela-
tions, even if the rate of transformation does in part depend on such
recognition. Change is an outcome of simultaneous effects in discur-
sive and productive relations.
At the present time, systemic relations of domination contami-
nate the products manifesting the intersubjectivity of social organiza-
tion. Understanding and articulation of social relationships of pro-
duction (or indeed any human activity) necessarily are the products of
conflict, since historical forms of production embody conflicts of real
interests, and consciousness of the forms of production mediates con-
flicting interests as contributions to knowledge. Understanding must
contain a dominant interpretation and therefore the recognition of its
own opposition.4 7 Consciousness on these terms at least weakens a
purely structuralist account of knowledge.4"
Can the subject be both decentered--constituted in conscious-
ness in an interactive way-and strategic or political? To the extent
the individual acts according to learned social practices themselves
purposive to social constructions or mimics their teachings, the action
remains strategic. Yet to the extent the individual recognizes that
these patterns of behavior and the meanings associated with them in
the process of reproducing them are interdependent, an attempt to act
in accordance with interaction will conform to their decentered con-
struction. To do so will either reduce or fail to reduce the alienation
involved in reproducing the dominant and suppressed interests inher-
ent in the meanings utilized in the experience itself. Any successful
reduction of alienation must therefore also account for difference. In
this way strategy could consciously evolve historically and pragmati-
cally in the recognizing of oneself in the other.49 Nor would such a
dynamic logically tend toward a Luddite levelling. The recognition of
no substance to the self except that which is known by reference to its
recognition in the other stimulates not only the moral demand of mu-
tuality, and therefore respect for difference, but also the self-preserva-
tion of technology directed to a material progress shared by all.
Indeed, this recognition suggests a further reciprocity of intersubjec-
tivity and ecology.50
It is possible to be a bit clearer at this point about the need to
47 J. Habermas, Theory and Practice 142-62 (J. Viertel trans. 1974).
48 For phenomenological critique of structuralism and law, see Heller, Structuralism and
Critique, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1984).
49 See generally Cornell, Toward a Modern/Post-Modern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 291 (1985) (discussing dialogic reciprocity).
5o Keane, supra note 27, at 99.
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move beyond dialogical reciprocity. Hegel's universal will became
particularized in a civil society of persons who expressed their identity
in making the other into property and confirmed their particularity in
exchange. Such a regime generated an abstract right of negative char-
acter, a right not to be interfered with, but no positive right of welfare
to overcome contingencies blocking satisfaction. Drucilla Cornell
suggests that the Hegelian need of reciprocal recognition should not
be limited to contract because, given inequalities, while the relation is
formally reciprocal it is not necessarily mutual. On these terms the
subject expands from universal contractual alienation of objects to
universal participation in conversation or exchange of ideas."1 The
significance of this reading for Hegel's social philosophy is not that
"the universal will of political and legal institutions is understood as
an all-encompassing subjectivity, Geist, but rather because it is con-
ceived of as the Mitte, or network of reciprocally constituted individu-
als which promises individual flourishing." '52 The accompanying
understanding of right is a principle of "nonsubordination" which dy-
namically and contextually creates a positive duty to the underlying
conditions and welfare which make communication authentic or "eye
to eye." This would include the obligation of government to give rea-
sons in imposing, or demand that reasons be given as the requirement
of enforcing private will in imposing, conditions or outcomes of sub-
stantive inequality. The contract transaction relation protected by
negative rights of noninterference is subsumed by the dialogic transac-
tion relation protected by positive rights of nonsubordination. At the
same time, the particularized subject still pursues reciprocal recogni-
tion outside the state in a civil society.
To be both reciprocal and mutual in more than form, to be actu-
ally so, requires more than offering reasons justifying inequalities of
conditions or entitlements. The reasons must be meaningful and
unalienating to individuals of equal interdependence. This suggests,
in Hegelian terms, a further broadening of universal participation into
interaction. The interaction of social construction of meaning, in or-
der to generate authentic meaning, requires actual participation in
meaning experienced as power. It therefore correlates to a right of
care or integration into a democratically conceived and structured
community. This is important to achieving the shared aim of Cornell,
The crowning achievement of modernity is precisely the embodi-
ment in right of relations of mutual recognition in which each sees
51 Cornell, The Poststructuralist Challenge to the Ideal of Community, 8 Cardozo L. Rev.
989 (1987).
52 Cornell, supra note 34, at 1606 n.58.
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the other as a self-conscious "I." The subject, as we have seen,
becomes a self-conscious "I" by taking possession of itself as other
than a merely natural, immediate being. It is this potential to be-
come a personality that marks each one of us a distinctive
person.5
3
As both positions develop intentionally between Hegel and Marx, "di-
alogic reciprocity" tilts toward Hegel and "interactive labor as mean-
ing" tilts toward Marx.
V. CONSCIOUSNESS: LEGALITY
Conflicts, and therefore threats to social reproduction occurring
in forms of material production, are often deflected into overtly polit-
ical institutions. While Marx thought such political conflicts and
their resolution derivative, Habermas argues the interdependence of
the political and economic:
[state intervention] no longer coincides immediately with the rela-
tions of production, i.e. with an order of private law that secures
capitalist economic activity and the corresponding general guaran-
tees of order provided by the bourgeois state. But this means a
change in the relation of the economy to the political system: poli-
tics is no longer only a phenomenon of the superstructure. 54
But while ideas are not simply derivative of economic practice, their
relation is also not entirely independent. On the contrary, functioning
markets are partially constituted through instrumental actions of the
state and indirectly buttressed by false consciousness of natural social
organization backed by legal encoding. First, if material conditions
and social relations including legal relations are produced in the same
manner, not only is there a lack of primacy between them, but also
law becomes both integral to social reproduction and embedded in
and of the same material conflicts. Second, legal institutions explicitly
function as arenas of conflict, self-consciously and falsely for rights
holders who have learned to believe consumption is a zero-sum game,
and functionally for society as a means of diffusing or mediating inter-
ests threatening the dynamic stability of the division of labor. Legal
discourse functions in the steering of social organization as an overt
articulation of social meaning. Third, the form of this articulation is
the mediation of conflict by identifying "justifiable" claims, whether
legislated, administrated, or adjudicated. Note, however, that the no-
tion of the state is not reducible to the actions of government actors or
53 Id. at 1592-93 (footnote omitted).
54 Habermas, Technology and Science as "Ideology," in Toward a Rational Society 81, 101
(. Shapiro trans. 1970).
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legal institutions. The state encompasses all official political articula-
tions and constructions of the legitimacy of power. Legal ideology
expresses the relational surface of empowered social structures as part
of the medium of social discourse. 5
Hegel in fact established an interconnection between legal norms
which combined mutual recognition in interaction with a formal sta-
bilization in processes of labor. However, this recognition did not re-
fer directly to the other, but to the other's products in exchange. 56
Thus, instrumental action, or labor and interaction, or consciousness
of mutual reciprocity, were linked in legal recognition of the products
of labor. Hegel viewed labor as separated from interaction. A labor
reunited with communication through collectively produced meaning
would take a different form of legal recognition. The atomized con-
tractors recognized in the property of their products would become
draftspersons, constructors, and consumers recognized in their con-
trol of resource investment decisions and resultant communities of
meaning. 57
Overcoming domination and its residual alienation will not result
from sympathetic reenactment or simulation of the situation of the
other. The formal equality of pluralistic regard for the particular in-
terests of autonomous individuals suggests a mutuality of recognition
in the legitimacy of reciprocal argument. This form of universality,
however, limits the normative question to what should be done to
communicate, and rests the idea of equality on the overlooking of dif-
ference. It is unclear why democratic solidarity follows from dialogic
community even as the conditions of true dialogue create mutual re-
spect. In opposing to the universality of dialogue an ideal of critical
social integration, the focus shifts to what to become collectively, and
is thus distinguished from the old notions of integration founded in
economic reductionism. Yet this stance seems to problematically re-
quire conceiving of a collective experience of decentered subjects
without a concept of the universal which destroys difference-that is,
a meaning of collective experience which is the underpinning of indi-
vidual and social differences within an equality which does not restrict
the significance of those differences. It demands beginning in con-
texts, preserving what is emancipatory about present circumstances,
including those aspects of liberal individualism which give constitu-
55 See J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (T. McCarthy trans. 1975).
56 See Ryan, Hegel on Work, Ownership and Citizenship, in The State and Civil Society:
Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy 178 (Z. Pelczynski ed. 1984).
57 See Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will Em-
ployment Revisited, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 765 (1985).
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tive meaning to individual participation in intersubjective experience.
In this way a universal need to achieve recognition in authentic social
meaning for an individual set of life experiences is subsumed in the
social integration of an unalienated political organization. Contrary
to Apel and Cornell, integration on these terms respects mutuality of
difference more than a communicative universality which, because it
lacks an account of power, cannot escape the disruption implied by a
division of labor necessary to reproduce the conditions in which dia-
logue is historically embedded. These historical conditions include
manifestations of power such as legal entitlements and the cumulative
meanings of domination continuously reproduced as the product of
alienated labor.
Contemporary legal institutions recognize the interests repressed
within legal discourse, but at the same time insist ideologically that
there is no real conflict, or at least no conflict beyond resolution, given
fair procedure and just rules. But despite the 'style and form of ra-
tional discourse, legal argument does not exist in and of itself; rather
it encodes social relations as politics, including and overlaying its own
institutional politics. As the purpose of legal argument is both de-
scriptively and by advocacy that of representation, the construction of
legal arguments per se involves an ideology of the dominant. The
marshalling of factual representations of human interaction, whether
in dispute, exchange, incentive, or command, by manipulating levels
of generality sets frames of reference to which abstract normative ar-
guments are appended. The result is more or less intentional legitima-
tion of "natural" relations within the existing social context including
material prerequisites, and derivative instrumental explanations of
collective force to secure them against countering expressions of social
conduct.58
The actions of the state in the form of law then are simply the
expressions of the formal legal tasks of conflict mediation as articula-
tion of the dogmatic form of social consciousness. These arguments
are usually also located in the rhetoric of past events of the same type,
58 The peculiarity of legal discourse is that it tends to constrain the political imagina-
tion and to induce belief that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are
just and rational, or at least inevitable, and therefore legitimate. The modus oper-
andi of law as legitimating ideology is to make the historically contingent appear
necessary. The function of legal discourse in our culture is to deny us access to
new modes of conceiving of democratic self-governance, of our capacity for and
the experience of freedom. Legal discourse inhibits the perception that we have it
in our power to alter and abolish existing patterns of domination and denial of
human potential. It is, in short, the vocation of legal thought to render radical
nonliberal visions of freedom literally inconceivable.
Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358, 1358 (1982).
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creating the logical illusion of continuity. This is not to suggest that
the conceptual images so constructed are not used to explain, rein-
force, or legitimate a real continuity in the exercise of power within
the social relations so encoded. Nor does it suggest that the produc-
tion of such constructions does not itself entail actual social relations
which affect the product. Of course, encoding the conflicts of social
relations, rendering their oppositions "natural" to an underlying so-
cial structure and restricting the outcome of those structures as power
to manageable challenges, cannot be accomplished by parroting only
the interest favored by the social structure. The favored are only
known in relation to the disfavored. Domination can only be under-
stood in relation to the minimal facilitation and protection of the
dominated. Moreover, legitimation of social power affects the domi-
nated consciousness by simultaneously stimulating anger and aliena-
tion over the injustice of the legal regime, while suggesting the
inevitability of social situations and the fault of the dominated. Law
seems ambivalently both legitimate and illegitimate.
Nevertheless, also by virtue of this dialectical interdependence,
an opening exists for changes in legal meanings. Transformation of
the legal relations discourse requires immanent critique of the rela-
tionship between the surface of legal rhetoric and structural replica-
tions of social organization on the one hand, and the legal system's
promise of a substantively fair arena of argument, informed by empir-
ical judgments accounting for the effects of social domination within
legal institutions, on the other.5 9 The point is to uncover the images
of historically contingent, that is human, experience taken as natural
which are the most important outcome relevant structural necessities
of distinctly legal argument. Yet, while the surface logic of legal
images reflects the dominant interest's interpretation of constructed
experience, the present meaning of legal experience rests in a deeper
structure which organizes expressions of both dominant and sup-
pressed interests.c° The missing key to that meaning which is known
by its absence is not the reversal of dominant and suppressed interest
in articulating the surface logic of doctrinal meaning structures. Such
attempts are doomed to instability, indeterminacy, and eventual sub-
sumption. They appear ridiculous to the social relations legally en-
coded, yet they fail to account for the structure of legal consciousness
in relation to social meaning which undergirds the doctrinal surface.
59 For a discussion of the use of deviant doctrine against itself, see R. Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement (1986).
60 For the entailments of the encoding of dominant and suppressed interests in law, see
Thompson, The Rule of Law, in Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of The Black Acts 258
(1975).
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It is rather the structure of meaning, implied by an alteration of con-
sciousness opened through removing the inevitability of present con-
ceptualizations of experience associated with dominant and sup-
pressed interpretations, which should be constructed in counter ideol-
ogy. This transformation can occur by a change of material condi-
tions reducing the hierarchy or antidemocratic meaning which
eventually resides in legal interpretation. But transformation can also
occur by rearticulating suppressed interpretations, even legal interpre-
tations, in a manner which cannot be reconciled with their presup-
posed organizing structure.
Law is made prominent by the centrality of its role in present
history. The prominence should not be considered accidental given:
(1) the necessity of legitimation in society's reproduction of the condi-
tions of its own existence; (2) that experience cannot be articulated
outside social existence; and (3) that existence remains conflicted and
alienating. The overcoming of alienated existence requires work.
This labor constitutes itself as consciousness, be it false or coherent.
The inescapability of social experience creates responsibility, and with
it an ideology of an active politics of argument. That responsibility,
however, is no less subject than any other intelligible aspect of con-
temporary existence to its collective or decentered construction.
Thus, the appearance of individualism and the exchange institutional-
ization of social relations in present conditions is itself the occasion of
dominance. History does not evolve but it does inevitably continue.
Any ideal, such as communication or dialogism, will remain simply
palliative unless actualized within historical struggle. Such a politics
will involve an ideology appropriate to effective operation within ma-
jor contemporary structural institutions. Therefore, at the middle
level of constructing legal argument, withdrawal is not really an op-
tion, because the legal institution will continue with or without repre-
sentation of alternative ideologies. Of course, legal institutions must
concurrently be forced to allow substantively effective participation
where formality presently suffices. Given this beginning, a pragmatic
acceptance of responsibility demands democratic equal warrant as the
most appropriate place to begin linking construction of idea and prac-
tice, as we labor toward new intelligibilities.
VI. WORK: PRODUCT
This Paper intrudes upon an ongoing, collective effort of imagi-
nation of a better existence which can be justified. As defined, all
labor signifies this artifactual quality as it gains an intelligibility signi-
fied by intrusion into a synthetic tradition of ideas. This artifact rep-
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resents itself as an alternative: on the surface an ideology of political
agency, in structure a repetitive critique of social theory manifest in
this Essay at the level of the sections devoted to (1) tradition, 61
(2) construction, 62 (3) rationality, 63 and (4) legality. 64 The replication
takes the following form. Separation of action and meaning fits social
phenomenon badly. Such separation, taken as knowledge, demands
an essentialist epistemology, a correspondence theory of truth to sus-
tain itself. Finally, domination encodes alienation as successive con-
ceptualizations of the generic fact of power natural to social system
organization. As a structure of critique it defines the alternative argu-
ment as a commitment to the confines of history-what we have made
ourselves collectively is not optional, what we can become we must
build together from now.
The implications of the present work which construct its alterna-
tive nature, and thus its self-identified trade on future argument, prin-
cipally involve these ideas: (1) meaning is produced socially by virtue
of relations qualitatively similar to relations of production of all social
conditions; (2) the interdependence of material conditions entails the
self as constituted in intersubjective historical relations; (3) labor as
the transformation of human time into intelligibility produces ideo-
logically charged meaning; (4) false consciousness is susceptible to an
immanent critique of ideology by virtue of the disjunction between an
individual meaning which denies the mutuality of selves experienced
intersubjectively, as opposed to the interdependent conditions and re-
lations of meaning's production; (5) the forces of production in their
most abstract form constitute an inescapable politics in the form of
the division of labor; (6) the division of labor in the reproduction of
historical societies reflects both differentiated experience based on
self-identity (difference) and institutionally mediated power; and
(7) an unalienated existence integrates a social experience character-
ized by interdependence of conditions, and interaction of persons, and
the equal warrant of each to participate in social construction or la-
bor. Collectively, these ideas constitute an ideology of society in the
form of democracy which knows its truth as equality.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 8-18.
62 See supra text accompanying notes 19-36.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 37-53.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
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